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PAYMENT INTO COURT UNDER SECTION 113(6) OF
THE LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
Jack Fleming*
RRSUM]
Paiement fait au tribunal en vertu de l'article 113(6) de la Loi sur la location
immobilire.
Dans cet article, il est question des versements fait au tribunal selon les termes
du paragraphe 113(6) de la Loi sur la location immobilijre. Ce paragraphe
traite du versement d'arri~r~s de loyer au tribunal qui est en instance de
l'audience concernant la demande du locateur au tribunal. L'article ne
s'int6resse ici qu'au cas particulier oii un locataire conteste la requate du
propri6taire en invoquant que ce dernier n'a pas tenu les lieux en bon 6tat.
L'auteur affirme que dans ce cas, le versement au tribunal n'est pas
n~cessaire.
II convient de noter que, lorsque cela doit 6tre fait, verser les arridrds au
tribunal peut s'av6rer une bonne tactique. Cela d6montre la sinc6rit6 dans la
defense du locataire tout en emp~chant le propri~taire de toucher le montant
du loyer. I1 arrive n~anmoins qu'effectuer ce versement au tribunal soit
fortement ddconseill6 ou mgme impossible.

1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE ISSUE
This article will discuss payment into Court pursuant to subsection 113(6) of
the Landlord and TenantAct.1 The subsection provides for payment of rent
arrears into court pending the hearing of a landlord's application. The
payment into court issue will be examined in the specific situation of a tenant
disputing the landlord's application on the basis of the landlord's failure to
keep the premises in a good state of repair. The writer will argue that payment
into court is not required in such cases.
* Jack

Fleming is co-director of Community Legal Services (Ottawa-Carleton, Ottawa,
Ontario) and teaches residential tenancies law at Queen's University Faculty of Law.

He is also managing editor of the Landlordand Tenant Case Index.

1. R.S.O. 1990 c. 1.7 [formerly R.S.O. 1980 c. 232] [hereinafter the Act].
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It should be noted that it is generally a good tactical move to make payment
into Court when that can be done. It may help to demonstrate the sincerity of
the tenant's defence, while still withholding the rent from the landlord.
However, sometimes it is either not possible or not desirable to make payment
into court.
1.2 THE FACT SITUATION
The fact situation considered in this paper is a common one: a tenant
withholds rent due to a landlord's failure to make repairs, and the landlord
serves notice of termination and brings an application to terminate the
tenancy. If the tenant simply retains the rent money, it can be paid into court
on commencement of the court application. However, the withheld rent is
often spent before a court application is brought.
In some cases, the financial hardship of living on a welfare allowance makes
it simply too difficult not to spend the money when the children are hungry
or another emergency arises. In other cases, the money is spent on items
relating to the repair issues, but for which receipts have not been retained.
For example: the rent money was used to pay the heat, which was abnormally
high due to holes in the wall; or food costs have escalated due to the broken
refrigerator; or medicine expenses have been incurred due to the failure to
properly heat the premises; or repair parts have been purchased. If receipts
are kept for any of these items, they could be filed in lieu of payment into
court, but tenants often realize that only after they get legal advice-when it
is too late, and they no longer have the receipts.
As well, the tenants in these cases will generally be claiming an abatement
of rent for the discomfort which they have lived through. It may be that the
rent withheld will equal the abatement eventually ordered. Tenants often
consider it unfair that they should have to make payment into court, when no
requirement is imposed on the landlord to make interim repairs or to pay the
estimated cost of repairs into court.
2. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Section 113(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act requires a tenant who is
disputing a claim for arrears of rent to, in certain circumstances, pay the
alleged arrears into the Court's bank account less certain items which may
be set off. The tenant's dispute cannot be heard without this payment into
Court. The wording of the subsection s. 113(6) is as follows:
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No dispute to a claim for arrears of rent or compensation under section 112
may be made by the tenant under subsection (5) on the grounds that the
landlord is in breach of an express or implied covenant unless the tenant has
first paid to the local registrar the amount of'the rent and compensation
claimed to be in arrears less,
(a) amounts paid by the tenant for which the tenant alleges he or she is entitled to set-off under clause 94(4)(b), as substantiated by receipts filed; and
(b) amounts of rent and compensation alleged by the tenant by his or her dispute to have been paid as substantiated by receipts filed or verified by affidavit.
Where a landlord brings an application under s. 113, the tenant may dispute,

pursuant to subsection 113(5), either by appearing on the return date of the
application or by filing a written dispute. The "compensation" referred to in
s. 113(6) is simply rent calculated on a daily basis after the termination date;
accordingly, for simplicity's sake, this paper will just refer to "rent", encompassing both "rent" and "compensation" in that term.

Given that only four days notice is required for an application under s. 113
(which means, for example, that notice can be served late on Friday for a
court appearance on the Tuesday after a long weekend), 2 a tenant is not given
much time to pull together these receipts and affidavits, or come up with the
money for payment into court.
Section 94(1) (formerly s. 96(1)) of the Act requires landlords to maintain
premises in a good state of repair, fit for habitation, and in compliance with

health, safety and housing laws. Subsection 94(4) provides remedies, including termination and a general provision of "such further and other order as

the judge considers appropriate". This latter provision can include abatement
of rent and damages. 3 Subsection 94(4)(b), referred to in s. 113(6), reads as

follows:
... the judge may,
(b) authorize any repair that has been or is to be made and order the cost
thereof to be paid by the person responsible to make the repair, such cost to
be recovered by due process or by set-off;

Section 121(3)(a) of the Act provides that:
2.

574127 Ontario Inc. v. Boutcher (1985), 1 W.D.C.P. 278 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [unreported]: the four days service provided for in s. 113 is not four clear days.

3.

Re Shaw andPajelleInvestments Ltd. (1985), 11 O.A.C. 70 (Div. Ct.).
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... the judge shall refuse to grant the application [for termination of the tenancy] where he or she is satisfied that,
(a) the landlord is in breach of the landlord's responsibilities under this Act
or of any material covenant in the tenancy agreement. [emphasis added]
Therefore, a finding that the landlord is in breach of his or her s. 94

responsibilities not only provides the basis for an application by the tenant
for repairs, abatement or damages; it also provides an absolute shield against
an eviction application brought by the landlord. 4 The section is mandatory,
and leaves no discretion to the judge.
Section 87 of the Act (formerly s. 89) provides that the common law rules as
to breach of a material covenant apply to tenancy contracts. This removes the
historical independence of covenants in tenancy agreements.
To summarize the relevant statutory provisions:
" the common law rules of breach of a material covenant apply (i.e. covenants are no longer independent)
* Section 94 imposes a duty to repair on the landlord.
" If the landlord is in breach of the duty to repair, the landlord cannot obtain
an order terminating the tenancy, due to s. 121(3)(a).
* A landlord's application for arrears of rent and termination is brought under
s. 113(4), with a minimum of four days notice.
" Subsection 113(5) sets out the provisions for a tenant's dispute.
" Subsection 113(6) requires a tenant to make payment into court, or file
receipts for the cost of repairs already paid for by the tenant, as a condition
precedent to filing a dispute to the landlord's claim for arrears of rent on the
basis of the landlord's breach of covenant.

4.

Re Rocca and Rouselle (24 September 1981), (Ont. Co. Ct.) [unreported]; Re Kralik

and DeDecius (1983), 2 T.L.L.R. 112 (Ont. Co. Ct.); Re Choi and Duke (2 December 1987), Halton DCOM2330/87, DCOM2444/87 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [unreported]. For
a limited exception to this general principle (not affecting non payment of rent
cases), see Re Bruns and Fancher(1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 781 (Div. Ct.), and Re Lypny
and Rocca (No. 2) (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 595 (Div. Ct.). On the mandatory nature of
s. 121(3), see Re Metzendorf and Thomas (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 286 (Div. Ct.).
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3.

OUTLINE OF ARGUMENTS

Two arguments will be offered to avoid payment into court in the fact
situation of a dispute based on the landlord's failure to meet the landlord's
duties under s. 94(1).
1. The subsection does not prevent a dispute based on breach of s. 94
(repairs obligations) as s. 94 is a statutory duty, rather than an express or
implied covenant.
2. The subsection does not prevent dispute of a claim for termination of a
tenancy, only dispute of a claim for rent arrears. The claim for termination
can be disputed without payment into court, and the order for arrears off-set
by a counter application for abatement of rent.

The first argument is the subject of conflicting Divisional Court authority,
but the more recent Divisional Court decision is contrary to the position taken
in this paper. Thus, this argument could only be advanced by a litigant
prepared to proceed to the Divisional Court. The second argument is supported by Divisional Court authority. 5
This paper will consider the applicable principles of statutory interpretation,
and apply them to s. 113(6). This mostly relates to the first argument listed
above. The caselaw dealing with payment into court will then be reviewed.
The paper will then offer a concluding opinion on the first argument (part 6
of this paper), and then go on to describe in*more detail how the second
argument would work. The paper concludes by noting that the first argument
(that s. 113(6) does not apply to breach of statutory duty) could be accepted
by a trial judge (given conflicting Divisional Court authority), but is unlikely
to be accepted at that level. The conclusion also notes that the second
technique for avoiding payment into court should be completely successful.

4.

INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLES

The proper interpretation of s. 113(6) is important for the argument that the
subsection does not require payment into court for a dispute based on breach
of statutory duty, as opposed to breach of covenant. The statutory construction is fairly straightforward for the argument based on challenging termination only, and using a s. 94 application to counter the arrears order.

5.

For an example of a case where this technique was used, see Re Choi and Duke,

ibid.

Payment Into Court Under Section 113(6)

4.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES
4.1.1 Object of the Act
The overall object and purpose of legislation must be considered in interpreting any part of it. Section 10 of the InterpretationAcI6 provides that every
Act is to be deemed remedial and "... shall accordingly receive such fair,

large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and
spirit." However, the "meaning and spirit" of the Act is expressed by its
wording, and the wording cannot be varied to suit a presumed object of the
legislation.
It is also worth bearing in mind that the "intention of the legislature" is often
really the intention of the drafters, who create the final expression of what is
agreed to by the majority of the legislature. As stated by Lord Reid:
"... we are in effect searching for the intention of the draftsman rather than

the intention of Parliament. And then itbecomes very relevant to ask--could
any competent draftsman have adopted this form 7of drafting if he had
intended the result for which the appellant contends?"

4.1.2. Literal Interpretation
The prevailing doctrine of statutory construction remains that of "literal"
interpretation but tempered by consideration of the "intent and purpose" of
the legislation. As stated by E.A. Dreidger, "Today's doctrine is therefore still
a doctrine of "literal" construction, but literal in total context and not, as
formerly, literal in partial context only." 8 Words are to be given their ordinary
and grammatical meaning, but in the context in which they are found.
If the words of the legislation are ambiguous, it may be necessary to go
beyond the ordinary meaning of the words, particularly to avoid conflict with
other provisions of the legislation. However, "[i]f the meaning is clear, the
consequences of the application of the words to specific facts are immaterial." 9 Judges are not to re-write legislation to obtain what they believe to be
a more "reasonable" result. 10
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.11.
Director of Public Prosecutionsv. Schildkamp, [1971] A.C. 1 at 10, cited in E.A.
Dreidger, Constructionof Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 106.
Constructionof Statutes,2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 83.
Ibi& at 86.
Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang, [1965] A.C. 182 at 222, per Lord Reid, R. v.
Mojelski (1968), 65 W.W.R. 565 at 570, per Culliton C.J., rev'g (1967), 60 W.W.R.

355, cited in Dreidger, supra, note 8 at 85-86. As stated in P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell
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4.1.3. Commission Reports
The reports of commissions of inquiry can be highly relevant in demonstrating the intent of the legislature. 11 In the case of the LandlordandTenantAct,
the Ontario Law Reform Commission inquiry and the legislative reforms
were closely linked. However, Lord Denning's comment on such reports is
useful to keep in mind:
"It is legitimate to look at the report of such a committee, so as to see what
was the mischief at which the Act was directed. You can get the facts and
surrounding circumstances from the report so as to see the background
against which the legislation was enacted. This is always a great help in
interpreting it. But you cannot look at what the committee recommended, or
at least, if you do look at it, you should not be unduly influenced by it. It
does not help you much, for the simple reason that Parliament12may, and
often does, decide to do something different to cure the mischief."
4.1.4. Uniformity of Expression
Another guide to interpretation is that "... the same words should have the
same meaning, and conversely, different words should have different meanings." 13

on the Interpretationof Statutes, 12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1969) at 29
(footnotes omitted):
"Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning,
anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd
or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not
to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is
just and expedient: words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as
embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they
should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the court is to expound the law as
it stands, and to "leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others."
11. Supra note 8 at 153, citing Eastman PhotographicMaterialsCo. Ltd v. Comptroller Generalof Patents,[1898] A.C. 571 (H.L.).
12. Letang v. Cooper,[1965] 1 Q.B. 232 at 240, cited in Dreidger, ibid. at 154.
13. Supra, note 8 at 93. As stated in Pierre-Andr6 C6t, The Interpretationof Legislation in Canada,2d ed. (Cowansville, Quebec: Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc., 1991)
at 279 (footnotes excluded):
"Legislative drafters are supposed to respect the principle of uniformity of expression. Each term should have one and only one meaning, wherever it appears in the
statute or regulation. An idea should be expressed in the same terms throughout the
enactment.
This rule of drafting leads to a principle of interpretation deeming a word to maintain the same meaning throughout. Similarly, a different expression implies a different concept: different terms, different meanings."
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4.1.5. Giving Meaning to All Parts of the Act
A construction which leaves some wording of the legislation without any
effect or meaning should be avoided. It is assumed that every part of the
14
enactment is there for a purpose.
4.2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LANDLORD
AND TENANTACT
At common law, covenants in a lease were independent. For example, the
obligation to pay rent continued even though the landlord failed to provide
heat, or even if the premises were destroyed. For residential tenancies, this
was cured by the introduction of s. 88 (now s. 87) in the 1969 amendments
to the Landlord and TenantAct. This amendment followed recommendations
contained in the Interim Report of the OntarioLaw Reform Commission on
Landlord and TenantLaw Applicable to Residential Tenancies in 196815
In the 1972 report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the OLRC), reviewing Part IV of the Landlord and TenantAct,
the Commission noted that some landlords' organizations had made representations that this interdependency of covenants would "... enable tenants
to withhold payment of rent with impunity on some pretext that the landlord
is in breach of some obligation on his part."1 6 The Commission noted that
the common law rules respecting breach of a material covenant would prevent
rent withholding for minor transgressions on the part of the landlord, and
stated "... [i]n the final analysis it is the adjudication by the judge of what is
a substantial breach of a material covenant which will govern and not the
caprice or whim of one of the parties. ' 17 The report also stated that"... [t]here
is no evidence before the Commission of actual abuse arising out of the
enactment of section 89 nor are we persuaded that such abuse is threatened
so long as the landlord can recover rent improperly withheld." 18
However, the Commission went on to note that being found right in the end
was cold comfort for a landlord where a tenant has improperly withheld rent
14.

P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretationof Statutes, 12th ed., (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1969) at 36.

15.

(Toronto: Dept. of the Attorney General, 1968.)

16.

Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Review of PartIV, The Landlord and

17.

Ibid.at 23.

TenantAct (Toronto: Dept. of Justice, 1972), at 22 [hereinafter OLRC].

18. Ibid
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and at trial either cannot be found or is judgment proof. The commission
recommended that where "... a tenant claims to be entitled to withhold rent

on the ground of an alleged breach of an express covenant or one implied
under the provisions of Part IV...", the tenantbe required to pay the rent to

the Sheriff (to avoid the formal procedures of payment into court). Such
payment was to be "... a condition precedent to the tenant being allowed to

file a dispute to the landlord's claim under the provisions of section 106."
The commission also recommended the two exceptions which are now found
in subsections (a) and (b) of s. 113(6).19
Contrary to the OLRC recommendation, the subsection 20 provides for payment into court, rather than payment to the Sheriff. As well, the legislation
speaks of a dispute based on "... breach of an express or implied covenant
... ", rather than "... breach of an express covenant or one implied under the
provisions of Part IV ... ".

The actual legislation also varies from the OLRC wording in that it specifically states that no "dispute to a claim for arrears of rent or compensation ..."
may be made, rather than prohibiting any dispute by the tenant without
payment into court. These changes, particularly the latter, suggest that the
drafters considered the potential "mischief' raised by the OLRC report, but
"... decide[d] to do something different to cure the mischief".21 The OLRC

intended that a tenant who did not make payment into court would be evicted
promptly, addressing the potential problem of staying in possession pending
a hearing, while rent remained unpaid. The legislature considered the OLRC
recommendations and chose a less draconian approach to the potential
problem.
In short, the legislative history suggests that the legislature decided to provide
a limited response to concerns about rent withholding, providing a mechanism for payment into court in such cases, with a limited penalty for failure
to make payment into court. Given the specific differences between the

19.

Ibid. at 24.

20.

Introduced in S.O. 1972, c. 123, s. 3(1) which replaced the previous content of s.
106 and now included the payment into court provision as s. 106(4). The wording
has remained substantially unchanged since then, although "as substantiated by
receipts filed or verified by affidavit" was added to subsection (b) in the 1975
amendments.

21.

per Lord Denning, Letang v. Cooper, supra, note 12, cited in Dreidger, supra, note
9 at 154.

Payment Into Court Under Section 113(6)

OLRC wording and the actual legislation, the wording should be considered
to have been deliberately and specifically chosen by the drafters.
With respect to the interpretation of s. 121(3)(a), which provides that a judge
shall refuse the landlord's application when the landlord is in breach of the
landlord's obligations, the wording initially proposed by the government was
"may", rather than "shall". The import of the choice between these two words
was specifically discussed by the House in committee, 2 2 so the use of the
word "shall" was deliberate. This is also demonstrated by reference to s.
121(2), where the word "may" is used.
4.3 REMEDIAL LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF TENANTS
Part IV of the Landlordand TenantAct is clearly remedial legislation aimed
at increasing the legal protection of tenants. Three successive Ontario Law
Reform Commission reports dealt with needed reforms of the law dealing
with residential tenancies. The Law Reform Commission began studying this
area of law in 1967, and the Interim Report of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission on Landlord and Tenant Law Applicable to Residential Tenancies was released in 196823 to deal with pressing problems requiring immediate attention pending more comprehensive reform. Following that, Part IV
of the Landlord and Tenant Act was enacted in S.O. 1968-69 c. 58
(implementing most of the suggestions of the OLRC). Part IV was enacted
to deal solely with residential tenancies.
The second report of the Law Reform Commission was in 1972 and reviewed
the reforms brought about by the introduction of Part IV.24 This lead to further
reforms to the Act in S.O. 1972, c. 123. The third report of the Ontario Law
Reform Commission, in 1976, dealt with both commercial and residential
tenancies.25 Many of the problems addressed in that report were anticipated
in reforms brought about in S.O. 1975, c. 13.
As stated in the introduction to the 1976 report:

22.

Ontario Legislature, Hansard pp. 1883-1884, (17 December'1975); Ontario Legislature, Hansard at 1956 (18 December 1975); Ontario Legislature, Bill 26, 30th
Legislature, as amended.

23.

Supra, note 15.

24. Supra, note 16.
25.

Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Landlord and Tenant Law (Toronto:

Ministry of Attorney General, 1976).
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"The concern of the commission was to redress the imbalance which existed
in the law in favour of landlords, an imbalance resulting from the law's preoccupation with rigid property principles of feudal origin and the failure of
the common law of landlord and tenant over the centuries to develop a legal
philosophy based on a theory of vital interests." 26

Two major aspects of the reforms were the provision of security of tenure
and the imposition of a broad duty of repair on landlords. These were
cornerstones of the legislative changes redressing "... the imbalance which
existed in the law in favour of landlords

... ".

The Attorney General at the

time (the Honourable Roy McMurtry) stated that the amendments about to
27
be introduced (in 1975) were intended to "... ensure security of tenure."
Many landlord and tenant decisions have referred to the remedial nature of
the legislation. In Re Baker and Hayward (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 695 (C.A.),
Wilson J.A. (as she then was), noted (at 699) that: "... one of the reasons for
the revision of the Act in 1969 was to rectify the imbalance deemed to exist
in favour of landlords." In Re Boyd and Earl & JennieLohn Ltd. (1984), 47
O.R. (2d) 111 (H.C.J.), Mr. Justice Potts observed (at 123):
"Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant Act is clearly remedial legislation. It
was enacted after an in-depth study by the Ontario Law Reform Commission
of the common law and statute law in this and many other jurisdictions.
Many of their recommendations were incorporated into the legislation.
When Part IV came into force on January 1, 1970, it significantly altered
and, in some respects, negated most of the rules which had long applied at
common law. Distress was abolished as was the doctrine of interessetermini.
Tenants were given significant security in their tenure and could not be
required to surrender possession in the absence of a court order or writ."

InRe Bruns andFancher(1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 781 at 784 (Div. Ct.) the court
stated:
"It is clear that Part IV of the Landlordand TenantAct, as it now stands, provides a code that not only governs the relationship between landlords and
tenants of residential premises, but provides a shield for the often helpless
tenant."

In Re Kasprzycki andAbel (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 536 (L.J.S.C.), Carnwath, J.
stated (at 542): "I find the Landlord and TenantAct to be, in large measure,
created for the protection of tenants." Recovery of excess rent paid under a

mutual mistake of law was ordered.

26.

Ibid.

27.

Ontario Legislature, Hansard,at 295 (6 November 1975).
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As legislation established for the protection of tenants, where there is any
lack of clarity in the wording, it should be interpreted in the tenant's favour,
in order to best express the purpose and intent of the legislation.
4.4 STRICT INTERPRETATION
The wording of the Landlordand TenantAct has generally been interpreted
strictly, without implying anything which is not clearly there. For example,
inReMetzendorfand Thomas (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 286, the Divisional Court,
in interpreting section 121(3)(c) of the Act, held that a Writ of Possession
may not issue where a reason for termination is that the tenant was attempting
to enforce his or her legal rights. The Court made it clear that a landlord could
have a valid reason for termination but the application still must be dismissed
if a reason for bringing the application (not necessarily the reason) was the
tenant's attempt to enforce his or her rights. No test of reasonableness or
proportionality was implied by the Divisional Court in that case. The subsection uses the word "a", not "the", and it was not open to the court to vary that
wording.

Apart from the general principle of strict interpretation, the Metzendorf case
is useful when looking at the impact of s. 121(3)(a), as the case dealt with
another subsection of s. 121(3). The decision highlights the mandatory nature
of s. 121(3).
In Re Bianchi andAguanno (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 76 (Div. Ct.), where the
landlord gave a tenant an extra day on a Notice of Termination, the notice
was found to be void as the Act states that it must specify the last day of the
month. The Divisional Court felt constrained to follow the clear language of
the statute.
The strict interpretation of the wording of the Act reflects the principle of
construction that words in an enactment are to be given their ordinary
meaning. If that meaning is plain, then the legislative intent must rule.
4.5 LANGUAGE USED IN S. 113(6)
An essential issue in interpreting s. 113(6) is whether the phrase "breach of
an express or implied covenant" is intended to cover breach of statutory duty.
The word "covenant" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary28 as:

28.

Nolan and Connolly, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1979) at 327.
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"An agreement, convention, or promise of two or more parties, by deed in
writing, signed, and delivered, by which either of the parties pledges himself
to the other that something is either done, or shall be done, or shall not be
done, or stipulates the truth of certain facts. At common law, such agree-

ments were required to be under seal. The term is currently used primarily
with respect to promises in conveyances or other instruments relating to real
estate.

In its broadest usage, means any contract.

Express or implied. The former being those which are created by the express
words of the parties to the deed declaratory of their intention, while implied
covenants are those which are inferred by the law from certain words in a
deed which imply (though they do not express) them. An implied covenant
is one which may reasonably be inferred from whole agreement and circumstances attending its execution."

The essence of the definition is that a covenant is an agreement between the
parties, not a duty imposed by statute. To define the words "covenant" or
"implied covenant" to include a statutory duty is to change the ordinary
meaning of the words. A change in the ordinary meaning of the words should
not be construed unless the legislation clearly expresses an intention to do
so. Contrast, for example, s. 23 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act2 9 which speaks directly of covenants which are to be "implied" into
conveyances. This language was not used in the Landlordand TenantAct.
As noted above (in part 4.2), the wording used is different from the wording
proposed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission, which would have more
clearly encompassed statutory duties. It may be that the wording is deliberately different, an interpretation supported by reference to other differences
between the OLRC wording and the actual subsection (see "Legislative
History", above). Conversely, it may be that the drafters simply assumed that
the statutory obligations were "implied covenants" and that further elaboration was unnecessary.
Of assistance here is the principle of uniformity of construction throughout
a statute. The same wording is expected to have the same meaning, and when
different wording is chosen, that is assumed to be deliberate.
Section 113(6) could have used the OLRC phrasing, or could have included
the words "or breach of responsibilities under this Act". That language was

29.

R.S.O. 1990, c. C.34.
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used in s. 121(3)(a) where the Act speaks of the landlord being "in breach sf
the landlord's responsibilitiesunder this Act or of any material covenant"

(emphasis added). Both subsections deal with the same subject matter-the
responsibilities of a landlord-yet use different language. Subsection
121(3)(a) distinguishes between statutory duties and covenants, indicating
that the drafters turned their minds to this distinction, and suggesting that the
reference solely to covenants in s. 113(6) is deliberate. This comparison is
particularly effective when one considers the interaction between the two
subsections, which presumably would have lead to them being considered
jointly by the drafters.
One can also look to s. 94 on this point. Section 94(4) uses the wording "the
obligations imposed under this section" not "the covenant implied by this
section". On the other hand, s. 113(6)(a) specifically provides for the filing
of receipts for items claimed as a set-off under s. 94(4)(b). This would seem
to suggest that a dispute based on the landlord's breach of s. 94 is covered by
the provisions of s. 113(6).30 This was considered by Borins, J.in one case,
where he commented that:
"In my respectful opinion, s. 106(6) [now s. 113(6)] is difficult to reconcile
with s. 96(3)(b) [now s. 94 (4)(b)] and is, in some respects, possibly misleading and requires legislative clarification." 3 1

4.6 UNUSUAL AND INEQUITABLE PROVISION'
It is also submitted that a mandatory provision for payment into court prior
to defending an action is so unusual, and contrary to the usual principles of
32
our legal system, that the provision should be very narrowly interpreted.
This is a form of judgment before trial, without even the opportunity to make
submissions on the interim issue. As such, it is an unusual and inequitable
provision.

30.

Of application here is the principle of construction that every word in the statute is
to be considered to have a meaning (see Part 4.1.5 of this paper).

31.
32.

Tucker v. Scott (1980), 22 R.P.R. 255 (Ont. Co. Ct.) at 283.
As stated by Borins, C.C.J., in Tucker v. Scott, ibid. at 285:

"I know of no other statutory requirement which makes payment into court by a
defendant of part or all of the amount claimed by a plaintiff a condition precedent to
the right of a defendant to defend."
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4.7 SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATION ISSUES
The following points support the interpretation that the phrase "breach of an
express or implied covenant" does not include breach of the landlord's duties
under s. 94(1).
1. To construe the word "covenant" to include a statutory duty is to change
the normal meaning of the word. The drafters could have phrased the legislation to clearly imply covenants into tenancy agreements, 33 but did not do
SO.
2. The language of the OLRC, which specifically referred to covenants
implied by Part IV of the Act and would have more clearly included s.
94(1) duties, was not employed.
3. Contrary to the OLRC recommendation, payment into court was only made
a condition precedent to disputing arrears, not disputing termination. This
demonstrates a choice of a more restrained approach to the problem than
that proposed by the OLRC. The adoption of a more restrained response, in
turn, suggests that the choice of wording "breach of an express or implied
covenant" was also deliberate, and was intended to exclude breach of statutory duty.
4. In s. 121(3)(a) the phrase "breach of the landlord's responsibilities under
this Act or of any material covenant in the tenancy agreement" was used,
suggesting that the drafters were differentiating between statutory duties
and covenants, yet the phrase "responsibilities under this Act" was not
used in s. 113(6).
5. Similarly, s. 94 uses the language "the obligations imposed under this section" rather than "the covenant implied by this section".
6. The severe consequences of any breach of the landlord's duties which is
imposed by s. 121(3)(a) (termination of the tenancy cannot be obtained)
indicates the high value which the legislature placed on compliance. The
interpretation of s. 113(6) argued for here is consistent with the intent
expressed in s. 121(3)(a).
7. The legislation is remedial legislation intended for the protection of tenants, and therefore any ambiguities should be resolved in favour of tenants.
8. The wording of Part IV has been strictly interpreted, and in accordance
with that principle the exact wording of s. 113(6) should be followed:

33.

For example, as in the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, supra, note 29.
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applying only to disputes based on breach of covenant, not to disputes
based on breach of statutory duty.
9. Making payment into court a condition precedent to filing a dispute is a
very unusual and inequitable provision, and as such should be narrowly
construed.
The following points support the interpretation that the phrase "breach of an
express or implied covenant" does include breach of the landlord's duties
under s. 94(1).
1. The drafters may have simply used the phrase "express or implied covenant" on the assumption that the responsibilities set out under the Act were
implied covenants, as described by the OLRC wording. (This does not
explain the difference in wording in s. 121(3)(a).)
2. Subsection 113(6)(a) specifically refers to receipts for set-offs claimed
under s. 94(4)(b). Why would that reference be needed if s. 113(6) did not
apply to disputes based upon breach of s. 94 obligations?
4.8 CONCLUSION ON INTERPRETATION OF THE SUBSECTION
The interpretation that s. 113(6) only requires payment into court where the
dispute is based on breach of covenant, not on breach of statutory duty, is
consistent with the legislative intent as evidenced by the language of the
legislation and the legislative history (both detailed above). The OLRC
wanted to avoid the possibility of tenants withholding rent due to minor
breaches of covenant, and the landlord then having to wait until the hearing
date to be vindicated. The drafters chose not to adopt the solution proposed
by the OLRC, but instead chose wording which requires payment into court
where the dispute is based on breach of covenant. This would serve to
eliminate rent withholding for breach of minor covenants in a lease. The
drafters did not include breach of statutory duty, presumably because the
duties set forth in the statute (such as the duty to repair) are important
responsibilities which warrant rent withholding; or at least important enough
that the landlord should not be able to avoid a hearing when payment into
court has not been made.
This interpretation is also supported by the fact that Part IV of the Act is
legislation enacted primarily for the protection of tenants. More specifically,
it is supported by the high standard placed upon the landlord by s. 121(3)(a).
This subsection requires a landlord to come to court with absolutely clean
hands: if the landlord is "... in breach of the landlord's responsibilities under
this Act or of any material covenant in the tenancy agreement" then an order
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for termination of the tenancy cannot be obtained. This evidences the very
high obligation placed on the landlord with regard to the landlord's obligations. It is an expression of the same legislative intent that governed the
wording of s. 113(6), which provides only a limited response to the potential
"mischief' of rent withholding.
The one obstacle to this interpretation is the reference in s. 113(6)(a) to s.
94(4)(b). That reference cannot be satisfactorily explained unless a dispute
based on s. 94 is encompassed by s. 113(6). It could be interpreted simply as
a convenient way to file receipts for s. 94(4)(b) set-ofs, on the theory that
these are likely to be a common cause for rent withholdihg, without requiring
payment into court for a dispute based on s. 94. This is a possible, but not
very satisfactory, explanation. One can also simply treat s. 113(6)(a) as bad
34
drafting, and ignore it where it conflicts with other provisions in Part IV.
On the other hand, construing s. 113(6) as including disputes based on breach
of s. 94 leaves no satisfactory explanation for the discrepancy in wording
between that subsection and s. 121(3)(a). The drafters distinguished between
statutory duties and covenants in s. 121(3)(a); how then can the word
"covenants" in s. 113(6) be taken to include both?
In short, either construction of s. 113(6) leaves some part of the Act with an
interpretation which does not fit the "ordinary and grammatical meaning" of
the words. Since, in either case, a meaning other than the usual one must be
found, it is submitted that the interpretation which best expresses the purpose
and intent of the Act, and of the particular subsection, should be adopted. As
outlined above, that would be the interpretation that s. 113(6) does not apply
to disputes based on breach of s. 94.
5. CASE LAW
Many cases have considered the application of section 113(6). This review
is divided into cases which oppose the requirement to pay into court where
the tenant's dispute is based on lack of repairs by the landlord, and those
which support payment into court in that situation. The three Divisional Court
cases dealing with the issue are Re Meridian Property Management and
Lanteigne (1972), [1973] 1 O.R. 541, Greenwin Property Management v.
McCormick (1982), 26 O.R. (2d) 161, and ReArthurs and Storey (1990), 23

A.C.W.S. (3d) 383 [unreported].

34.

Supra, note 31 at 283-287.
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5.1 AGAINST PAYING INTO COURT
Re Meridian Property Management and Lanteigne (1972), [1973 1 O.R.
541 (Div. Ct.)
In this case, the landlord opposed the hearing of the appeal on the ground that
the tenant should have made payment into court pending the appeal, pursuant
to s. 106a(2) (now s. 116). This section provides that where payment into
court has been made, it must continue to be made while the matter is under
appeal. Divisional Court noted that payment into court was not required at
the first level in this case, and therefore was not required on appeal. The court
stated (at 545):
"... this is not a case under which it was necessary to dispute a claim for

arrears of rent or compensation as Miss Ramsay's only desire was to dispute
the right to possession.
The landlord in his notice of motion claimed, as he was entitled to claim,
three different types of relief, namely, an order that the tenancy was terminated, that the landlord was entitled to possession, and a sum of money for
compensation and costs of the application. No dispute to a claim for compensation was made and hence the provisions of s. 106(4) that made payment a condition precedent had no application, so that s. 106a(2) in its turn
does not come into play."

Tucker v. Scott (1982), 22 R.P.R. 255 (Co. Ct.)
His Honour Judge Borins held that s. 96 (now s. 94) created a statutory duty,
not an implied covenant, and therefore there was no need to make payment
into Court. He also held the corollary, that there was no justification for a
tenant to deduct rent based on breach of an implied (by s. 96, now s. 94)
material covenant. The decision examines carefully (and critically) the language of the subsection.
Greenwin Property Management v. McCormick (1982), 36 O.R. (2d) 161
(Div. Ct.)
The tenant's claim was based on a number of issues, some of which involved
breach of covenant and others of which involved breach of statutory duty.
The Divisional Court held that the District Court Judge was correct in not
hearing the claims based upon breach of covenant without payment into
Court, but that he erred in not dealing with the matter on the basis of the other
disputes, those based on breach of statutory duty. It is not known if s. 96 (now
s. 94) was one of the grounds for dispute, as it is not specifically referred to
in the judgment.
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Re BellanadaHoldings andBarnaby (1982), 1 T.L.L.R. 101 (Ont. Co.
Ct.)
His Honour Judge Gibson applied the Greenwin reasoning to a dispute based
upon s. 96 (now s. 94).
Re McFarlaneand LaHaise (19 May 1987), Halton DCOM 1943/87,
(Ont. Co. Ct.) [unreported]
His Honour Judge Carnwath held that s. 96 (now s. 94) is a statutory duty
and therefore s. 113(6) does not apply when the tenant's dispute is based upon
breach of s. 96 by the landlord. As in Re Bellanada,the Greenwin reasoning
was applied.
Re ElieffInvestments andJohnson (29 July 1987), (Ont. Dist. Ct.)
[unreported]
His Honour Judge J.F. McCort held that payment into Court is not required
under s. 113(6) when the tenant's dispute is based upon breach of the statutory
duty contained in s. 96 (now s. 94), as opposed to breach of covenant.
Re Choi andDuke (2 December 1987), Halton DCOM2330/87,
DCOM2444/87 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [unreported]
This decision is an example of the interaction of s. 113(6) with s. 94 and s.
121(3)(a). In this case, the tenant owed $2,750.00 in rent. The tenant had
withheld rent due to substantial repair problems, but had unfortunately spent
the withheld rent before contacting a legal clinic. The tenant's defence was
lack of repairs by the landlord, relying upon s. 121(3)(a) of theAct. Carnwath,
D.C.J. rejected the landlord's argument that payment into Court should have
been made, and the tenant's cross-application for repairs and abatement was
successful. The net result was that there was an order for repairs to be made
(within a set time period) and arrears still owing (after abatement) of
$1,400.00, with only $550.00 having been paid into court. The tenant was
then in a position to pay off the remaining arrears of $850.00 over time, with
no danger of eviction.
5.2 CASES FAVOURING PAYMENT INTO COURT
Re VictoriaPark Community Homes andBuzza (1975), 10 O.R. (2d)
251 (Co. Ct.)
This was an application by a landlord and the tenant had paid the money
claimed into Court. The issue was not payment into Court, it was whether s.
96 (now s. 94) could be a defence to a landlord's application, rather than
proceeding with a separate s. 96 (now s. 94) application. The decision states
that it can be a defence provided that the tenant has paid the arrears claimed
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into Court (at 254). This was an obiter remark: payment into Court was not
an issue in that case.
Re BramaleaLtd. and Williams (1979), 23 O.R. (2d) 509 at 512 (Co. Ct.)
The tenant disputed on the basis that damages suffered from a plumbing
problem exceeded the amount of arrears. The Court looked at s. 106(6) (now
s. 113(6)) and stated that the application could not be disputed as there was
no payment into Court, and also that damages could not be obtained under s.
96 (now s. 94). This latter point is no longer the case: Re Shaw and Pajelle
(1985), 11 O.A.C. 70 (Ont. Div. Ct.). The case is prior to Greenwin and does
not address the argument raised in that case.
Re SantiniandMiller (1985), 2 T.L.L.R. 233 (Co. Ct.)
This decision states that the tenant's affidavit alleged breach of covenant,
including water seepage. His Honour Judge Sullivan stated that he disagreed
with the conclusion in Bellanada Holdings. However, His Honour consistently referred to breach of covenant, so it is not clear that s. 96 (now s. 94)
was raised as a defence. It is clear from the decision that no application was
made by the tenant under s. 96 (now s. 94).
ReArthurs and Storey (1990), 24 A.C.W.S. (3d) 383 (Ont. Div. Ct.)
[unreported]
Mr. Justice O'Leary, in a dissenting opinion, stated that the repair obligation
of the landlord under s. 96 (now s. 94) creates an implied covenant, and
therefore the provisions of s. 113(6) do apply, requiring payment into court.
The majority decision, given by Mr. Justice Southey, states:
"Even though the tenant's claim under s. 96 is for breach of a statutory duty,
rather than the breach of an express or implied covenant, the clear implication of s. 113(6)(a) is that a claim by the tenant under s. 96 is a defence only
to the extent to which the tenant alleges he is entitled to a set-off in respect
of amounts paid by him."
It is interesting that this decision distinguishes statutory duty from breach of
covenant (unlike O'Leary, J.'s "implied covenant" analysis) yet applies s.
113(6). The court held that the trial judge had erred, however, in refusing to
hear the section 96 applications of the tenants, holding that those claims
should have been dealt with as "swords" even though they could not function
as "shields". The decision also states that "I do not think it should make any
difference whether the landlord or tenant acted first to enforce his rights."
The majority decision expressly does not deal with the application of s.
121(3)(a), stating:
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"The right to possession was never in issue in Bresso v. Scruton and had
become moot in Storey v. Arthurs before that case came before us. It is,
therefore, unnecessary to decide whether Tobias J. was obliged under s.
121(3) to deal with the tenants' allegations under s. 96 before granting a writ

of possession."

Mr. Justice Southey does state that "I would not interfere with the orders
below for payment of arrears of rent, for declarations that the tenancy
agreements were terminated, and for costs." However, this is not a statement
condoning termination due to failure to pay into court, given the later
comment (cited above) that the right to possession was not in issue, and the
fact that the effect of s. 121(3)(a) was expressly not dealt with. There is no
reference in this decision to the Greenwin case, or any other caselaw.
However, the decision does clearly deal with the issue raised in Greenwin,
that of the distinction between statutory duty and breach of covenant. As
Greenwin was not overruled, there is now conflicting Divisional Court
caselaw on this point.
5.3 IMPLIED COVENANT
A number of cases which do not deal at all with s. 113(6) have held that the
duty to repair contained in s. 96 (now s. 94) is an implied covenant. 35 Thus,
these cases could be used to support the application of s. 113(6) in the fact
situation under consideration. However, while the "implied covenant"
approach was adopted by O'Leary, J. in Re Arthurs and Storey, it was not
accepted in the majority decision.
6 CONCLUSION ON BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY
This argument is simply that s. 113(6) only requires payment into court when
the dispute is based on the landlord's breach of a covenant. A dispute based
on s. 94 repair problems is based on breach of statutory, duty, and therefore
s. 113(6) does not apply.
This argument is unlikely to be successful at the trial level. Since there is
conflicting Divisional Court authority on the point,3 6 a trial level judge could

35.

Re Claydon and Quann, [1972] 2 O.R. 405 (Co. Ct.) (obiter, nothing turned on
whether s. 96 (now s. 94) was a statutory duty or implied covenant); Re Quann and
Pajelle (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 769 (Co. Ct.) (s. 96 found to be an implied covenant so
as to uphold the tenants' right to withhold rent due to the interdependency of covenants); Re Balmy Beach Investments and Prefontaine (6 October 1978), (Ont. Co.
Ct.) [unreported] (again, implied covenant found to justify withholding of rent by
tenants); Re Temlas andDesloges (1980), 20 O.R. (2d) 30 (Div. Ct.) (obiter).
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chose to accept the earlier decision. Both cases deal with the identical issue
and address the identical argument (covenant vs. statutory duty). The earlier
decision is per curiam, whereas the later is not, and the more recent decision
does not refer to, or over-rule, the earlier decision. However, such a decision
at the trial level is unlikely. The most recent decision is more likely to be
followed, particularly since the earlier authority does not make specific
reference to s. 94 whereas the most recent authority does specifically address
this argument in the context of a dispute based on s. 94. It is the writer's
position that the Arthurs decision is wrong, for the reasons set out in this
paper, but that argument will probably have to be dealt with at the Divisional
Court level, or higher, to be successful.
7

DISPUTING TERMINATION, NOT ARREARS

7.1 OUTLINE OF THE PROCEDURE
Section 113(6) states that a tenant cannot dispute a "claim for arrears of rent
or compensation" without payment into Court. Normally, a landlord will be
claiming those two items and also termination of the tenancy and a Writ of
Possession. These are all separate claims allowed under s. 113(1) and are
contained in a single Court application. A tenant can dispute claims for
termination and a Writ of Possession without payment into Court: Re Meridian PropertyandLanteigne (1972), [1973] 1 O.R. 541 (Div. Ct.).
Thus, a tenant can dispute the claim for termination and for a Writ of
Possession without payment into Court (the dispute being based on s.
121(3)(a)), and deal with any abatement of the rent claim through commencement ofa s. 94 application which may be heard at the same time. InReArthurs
and Storey, the dissenting opinion expressly opposed this procedure, and the
majority decision expressly stated that failure to make payment into court
should not block the hearing of the s. 96 (now s. 94) application of the tenant.
The decision expressly made no comment on the application of s. 121(3)(a)
to the claim for termination.
To give an example, a tenant who owes rent but is claiming that the landlord has
(and continues) to breach s. 94 could concede that the arrears are owed (not
disputing the arrears, as payment into court is not being made). However, the
tenant would challenge termination by relying on s. 121(3)(a). This could result

36.

Greenwin PropertyManagement v. McCormick (1982), 36 O.R. (2d) 161 (Div. Ct.),
ReArthurs and Storey (1990), 24 A.C.W.S. (3d) 383 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported].

(1992) 8 JournalofLaw and SocialPolicy

in an immediate order for the arrears owed and would cause the setting of a
trial date for the termination issue. The tenant can then start a s. 94 (or s.
113(1)(f)) application for abatement and arrange for that to be heard at the
same time. At trial, the arrears could not be contested-an order would go
for that-but termination could be, and the tenant's s. 94 application could
lead to an order for abatement to set off against the order for arrears. If breach
of s. 94 by the landlord is made out, then no order for termination could be
made, 37 even though there may still be outstanding arrears after set-off of the
38
abatement.
The landlord would get an order for rent owed, but it would not be accompanied by an order for termination, nor could there be an order for termination
in the event that the arrears adjudged are not paid (due to s. 121(3)(a)). The
landlord would be in the same position as any other judgment creditor. In the
s. 94 (or s. 113(1)(f)) application, the tenant could then obtain an order for
money owed by the landlord for abatement of rent, 3 9 which could be set-off
against the order for rent arrears.
7.2 DISPUTING TERMINATION ON RETURN OF
THE APPLICATION
In some areas, the local registrar has signed judgment terminating a tenancy,
where the tenant has failed to make payment into court. There is no jurisdiction for such an order. The registrar has no inherent jurisdiction, and the
power granted by s. 113 is simply to set a date for a hearing if the tenant
disputes the application (either in writing or by appearing), or to sign default
judgment when the claim is not disputed.
Pursuant to s. 113(6), where payment into court is not made, "no dispute to
a claim for arrears of rent ... may be made by the tenant under subsection (5)

37.

Re Rocca and Rouselle, Re Kralik and DeDecius, and Re Choi and Duke, supra,
note 4.

38.

In one bizarre case, a landlord gave notice of termination due to damage to the property and applied to court for possession. There was no claim for rent arrears, yet the
landlord wanted payment into court. Incredibly, the District Court Judge agreed that
failure to pay the alleged cost of the damage into court disentitled the tenants from
proceeding with their dispute. This was overturned by the Divisional Court: Re
Temple andHussain(1989), 16 A.C.W.S. (3d) 86 [unreported].

39.

The tenant's s. 94 application can be brought simply by disputing the landlord's
application, and this is a common practice. For a judicial comment on this, see Re
Victoria Park Community Homes Inc. andBuzza (1975), 10 O.R. (2d) 251 (Co. Ct.).
Contrast, however, Tucker v. Scott, supra,note 31 at 288.
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...". Thus, in that case it would appear that even if the tenant has appeared
(which constitutes a "dispute" under subsection (5)), there is no dispute to
the claim for arrears and therefore default judgment for arrears could be
issued under s. 113(7).
However, this would only apply to the claim for rent-not the claim for
termination. Normally the tenant will still want to dispute termination, on the
basis of repair problems and s. 121(3)(a), or at least on the basis of relief from
forfeiture. Unless the tenant expressly states that she or he is not disputing
termination, the registrar only has the jurisdiction to set a hearing date on the
issue of termination. 40
In some cases, a registrar has sent the matter directly to a judge, who has
ordered that payment into court be made or an order will go terminating the
tenancy. It is submitted that there is no jurisdiction for such an order by a
judge. There is no provision in Part IV for interim orders, but the court's
inherent jurisdiction to control its own process would provide authority for
interim orders. However, that inherent jurisdiction to control process should
not be used to counter a direct statutory provision. Section 113(6) specifically
deals with the issue of payment into court, and does not make payment in a
condition precedent to disputing termination. This clear statutory provision
has been confirmed by the Divisional Court. 4 1 For a judge to order payment
into court as a condition precedent to disputing termination is in direct
contravention of both the statute and appeal court authority.
The only way in which a judge could deal with this, and remain in compliance
with s. 113, would be to hear the case forthwith. If the sole defence of the
tenant is relief from forfeiture, this may be realistic. However, in the fact
situation considered in this paper-a dispute based upon repair problems-it
would be unrealistic to expect a tenant to proceed immediately to trial, on the
first appearance, on four days notice (not even four clear days) and probably
not yet having obtained legal advice. In all but the most simple cases, it is
submitted that to proceed immediately with a hearing would be to provide
ample grounds for overturning the decision on appeal. However, it would be

40.

Re MeridianPropertyManagement and Lanteigne (1972), [1973] 1 O.R. 541 (Div.

Ct.). On the issue of a dispute being made simply by the tenant's appearance, there-

fore restricting the registrar's jurisdiction, see Re Taro and Sykes (25 August 1978),
(Ont. Co. Ct.) [unreported], and Re OntarioHousing CorporationandDanicki (10
April 1978), (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported].
41.

Re MeridianProperty,ibid

(1992) 8 JournalofLaw and Social Policy

proper to set an early hearing date (depending on the complexity of the case)
where no payment into court is made.
8
CONCLUSION
At the trial level, a judge faced with the argument that s. 113(6) does not
apply as s. 94 is a statutory duty, rather than a covenant, is unlikely to accept
that argument, due to the decision inReArthursandStorey. It could be argued
that there is conflicting Divisional Court authority and that the trial judge
should follow the Greenwindecision, but a tenant wishing to argue this point
will probably have to be prepared to take the issue to Divisional Court.
Since the Arthurs decision, the best way to avoid payment into court is
through the method outlined just above: dispute the termination and not the
arrears. This approach is supported by Arthurs and Storey. That decision
expressly holds that the trial judge was not justified in refusing to hear the s.
96 (now s. 94) applications because payment into court had not been made.
Further, the decision notes that the right to possession was not in issue and it
was "therefore, unnecessary to decide whether Tobias J. was obliged under
s. 121(3) to deal with the tenants' allegations under s. 96 before granting a
writ of possession."
Thus, in its most recent decision on s. 113(6), the Divisional Court has
expressly confirmed the ability of a tenant to bring a counter application for
abatement under s. 94 and have it heard concurrently with the landlord's
application, even if payment into court has not been made. In that same
decision, the court has expressly not commented on the effect of s. 121(3)(a)
on a landlord's application for termination in these circumstances. The
existing caselaw on s. 121(3)(a), and the plain language of the subsection,
indicate that termination of the tenancy could not be obtained where the
landlord is in breach of the s. 94 duties.

